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Bosnia Herzegovina, this country which lies in the heart of the Western Balkans, is 
home to one of the most diverse populations in Europe. For centuries it has been a 
meeting point between Occident and Orient and thereby developed a unique and 
diverse cultural history. It has also been most severely affected by the Yugoslav 
Wars which ravaged the region for almost a decade and brought an end to decades 
of Communism in the Balkans.  
Due to its ethnic diversity, the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia affected Bosnia much more than other countries in the region and the 
ensuing war saw some of the worst atrocities committed on European Soil since 
World War II. To this day a set of International Actors is involved in making sense of 
the situation and trial the people responsible for these crimes.  
The years of war have destroyed not just much of the country’s infrastructure but also 
the relations between different ethnic groups, who were turned from neighbours into 
enemies. In order to make the country work, a diverse set of International Actors 
engaged in external state building and erected a system that is largely based on 
ethnic division. Arguably, necessary in the immediate post war situation, the 
hermetically seperation of competences along ethnic lines has seriously impeded the 
country’s development and many of its institutions are profoundly flawed. As a result 
not much has changed in the past twenty years and while other countries in the 
region move towards EU membership, Bosnia remains unchanged.  
This has led to increasing discontent within civil society which erupted just last year in 
violent protests, taking over large parts of the country. The incident painfully exhibited 
just how unstable the country still is. 
The present situation is bound to have negative consequences for the European 
Union with regards to future enlargement in the Western Balkans. The reason that 
Bosnia matters is foremost due to its geographic position. Owning to its central 
location, the country will eventually be encircled by the EU, making it a necessity for 
the latter to ensure the country’s stability. An instable country in the heart of one of 
Europe’s future regions, would pose a serious risk to Internal security. Moreover most 
of its neighbours have an active stake in the country which increases the chance of 
any future conflict having a spill over effect in the region at large. Hence any credible 
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enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans must have the stabilisation of Bosnia 
at its heart.  
Given the importance of the topic, a large body of literature has developed and many 
of the important European think tanks have established separate chapters dealing 
with the Western Balkan at large and specifically Bosnia. The main weakness of the 
existing body of literature is the high level of division amongst different authors. Much 
like the International approach towards Bosnia, recommendations issued by different 
think tanks differ widely both in their assessment of current policies and in their 
recommendations for future engagement. Many scholars offer remedies for a specific 
illness detected in the country but fall short of elaborating an all embracing approach 
towards the country. While issuing recommendations, often other aspects of Bosnian 
statehood, which threaten to undermine said proposals are left out.  
What I hope to achieve with my thesis, is to engage with wide parts of the literature 
and thereby offer a concise analysis of the present state of the Bosnian political 
system and account for the causations that have aided its development. Finally I am 
aiming at establishing a set of recommendations that can help rectify these  
shortcomings. 
 
My analysis will be based on a wide variety of both primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources consist of official EU documents, OHR1 documents, documents by 
third states, international treaties and court judgments.  
These documents have facilitated my understanding of the current Bosnian state 
system and the extent of International engagement within the country. 
My secondary sources consist of a diverse set of books and articles that have been 
published over the past twenty years. Some of these sources were issued just after 
the cessation of war, whereas the most recent ones are only  a few months old.  
I increasingly used books when coming to terms with the history of the country. 
Several authors have written concise accounts of the Balkans turbulent history with 
special regards to the most recent conflict. Apart from this, I have also used some 
books, focussing on the effectiveness of state building programmes in Bosnia as well 
as the political situation in the country. Authors unanimously concluded that the 
present Bosnian system is largely plagued by flaws and inefficiencies. However they 
differ in their verdict over external state building. Some hold it exclusively  
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6 
 
responsible for the mentioned shortcomings, whereas others assume that externally 
driven state building per se works and that there were other factors that have led to 
the current situation. 
The rest of my analysis largely relies on various papers published by renowned think 
tanks that have engaged with the region in the future. Institutions such as the DPC, 
ESI, FRIDE, ECFR and Carnegie Europe2 have frequently issued policy papers on 
the developments in the region. The ECFR just last year founded a research mission 
to the Balkans, whose findings were latter published in form of a Policy Paper. The 
ESI, has also produced a set of documentaries which focus on the Balkan at large. 
The episode on Bosnia, includes the opinions of a diverse set of actors, ranging from 
returnees, local politicians and the next generation of Bosnians. 
The following work will be divided into four chapters. Initially I will lay the ground for 
the subsequent analysis by focusing on the most recent history of the region and how 
this has been responsible for many of the problems we encounter today. Secondly I 
will focus on the present political system of Bosnia and exhibit why it has fallen short 
of moving the country away from its post war consensus. Thirdly I will show the role 
played by International Actors, in establishing the current situation. Thereby I will 
largely focus on the role played by the European Union and the OHR. Finally I will 
offer a summary of my findings and conclude with a set of recommendations that 
could help fostering development within the region. 
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 Democratization Policy Council, European Stability Iniative, Fundacion Relaciones Internacionales y dialogo 
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“Bila Jednom Jedna Zemlja……”3 
 
Any serious analysis of Bosnian politics or indeed the politics of any Western Balkan 
nation has to include an overview of the history of its predecessor state. Except for 
Albania each country situated in the region today was prior part of the Kingdom 
(1918-1943) and later the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. (1945 – 1992) Unlike the 
dissolution of the USSR, which in large parts happened peaceful, the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia led to major armed conflicts which eventually had impacts for the whole 
region. 
The Socialist Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was created in the aftermath 
of the Second World War in an attempt to unite all the South Slavic nations in one 
country. This underlying idea was far from novel and attempts at a unified states had 
been made since the 1830s, all of them unsuccessful. [Lampe 2000 pp.39-71] The 
SFYR consisted of six regions4 which on paper were given wide reaching autonomy 
but in practice ended up being subjected to decisions taken by the central authorities 
in Belgrade. In the mid-60s, after serious tensions over the allocation of powers 
arose, the Communist Leadership decided to make worth on its promise and refer 
some powers to the regions. [Calic 1996 pp.13-30] The federal system that was 
established was far from being effective and clear but left open the extent to which 
competencies were being divided between the regional and the national level. Initially 
Belgrade hoped to appease regional communist leaderships by offering them 
decision making powers on few and relatively unimportant topics. This plan 
eventually backfired as the regional governments were able to press for more and 
more autonomy from the state. This process of federalisation was drawn out for 
twenty years and by the end of the 1980s regional governments were running quasi-
independent administrations, with the Central State having degenerated into a 
symbolic figure with no real powers attached to it. [Glenny 2000 pp.634-663] At the 
same time the economic situation of the country was worsening and broad discontent 
arose over the inability of politicians to address the situation properly. This economic 
stagnation was not unique to Yugoslavia but widespread across large parts of 
                                                          
3
 Once upon a time there was a country…. (Opening lines to Emir Kusturica’s Underground) 
4
 Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia 
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Central and Eastern Europe. Initially the economic system developed under 
Communism seemed superior to Capitalist economics, as it allowed for rapid growth 
and a better allocation of resources. However over time, its flaws became more and 
more apparent as economic growth came to a halt and stagnation set in. The 
situation in Yugoslavia was worsened by the decentralised system, as regional 
governments were unable to coordinate their economic policies. [Judah 1997 pp.135-
168] 
The re-emergence of nationalism in the Balkans can be explicitly linked to the 
deteriorating economic situation, which triggered deep dissatisfaction with 
communism. In most communist states, the outgoing leadership, realising that their 
ideology base was dwindling, created new ways of coping with the changing 
environment and keep their hold on power. In Yugoslavia, the ruling elite utilised 
nationalism in an attempt to replace one ideology (Communism), with another 
(Nationalism) helping them to retain control over the country. In the Socialist Republic 
of Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic, a communist through and through, 
reinvented himself as an aggressive nationalist, reviving the idea of a Greater 
Serbian Nation5. [Malcom 1998 pp.213-234] He utilised the latent mistrust of Serbs 
towards Croats and Muslims by accusing them of trying to undermine the state, usurp 
power and subject all other ethnicities to their rule. Most Serbs still vividly 
remembered the short but violent times of the Ustasa6 regime during World War II 
and were therefore easily convinced by the alleged threat. [Glenny 2000 pp.634-663 ] 
Milosevic’s rhetoric successfully rallied the majority of Serbs around his leadership 
but at the same time alienated all other ethnic groups in the country. His plan was to 
remove the regional power structures established since the 1960s and to centralise 
all of the power in Belgrade. In theory this would have helped the country to escape 
the years of political stagnation, experienced under an unsuccessful federal system. 
[Judah 1997 pp.135-168] However, Milosevic planned for a dominating role of 
Serbians in the new country, which were to subjugate all other ethnicities under their 
leadership. [Judah 1997 pp.135-168] It was the fear of this political dominance that 
eventually convinced regional governments to declare their independence from 
                                                          
5
 Velika Srbija or Greater Serbia, is a nationalistic ideology which emphasises the erection of a Serbia State 
within the boundaries of the short-lived Serbian Empire. Such a state would include large parts of Croatia, 
Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and Greece. 
6
 Fascist Croatian Revolutionary Movement which governed the Independent State of Croatia during World 
War II. The latter was a puppet state of the Axis Powers to keep control over the Balkan Peninsula.   
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Yugoslavia. This rings especially true for Bosnia Herzegovina. The region was highly 
heterogeneous and therefore benefited the most from maintaining a unified country. 
However once Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, the threat of becoming 
subject to Serbian rule became simply too big. [Malcom 1996 pp.234-253] 
The International Community was largely caught off guard by the developments in 
the region. At the time International Actors were focused on the developments in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where the demise of communism had established 7 
new small to medium-sized countries. Given this already complex situation, many 
countries preferred a retention of Yugoslavia as opposed to creating up to 6 new 
countries in the Balkans. [Finlan 2004 pp.13-19] The European Community proved to 
be highly divided on the topic. Countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain 
which at the time struggled with their own ethnic diversity, were naturally hesitant to 
establish a precedent for their people at home. On the other side countries such as 
Austria or Germany, which had functioning federal systems in place, proved much 
more flexible on the issue. Yugoslav politicians were quick to exploit this internal 
division. [Calic 1996 pp.218-237] Milosevic successfully lobbied for his cause in 
London, Paris and Madrid, whereas Croat leader Franjo Tudjman was able to 
convince the Germans and the Austrians of his endeavour. Many scholars criticised 
the European Community’s lack of unity over the issue and insist that the EC 
underestimated the threats presented by ethnically driven nationalism. By the time 
the severeness of the situation was understood, it was already too late to obtain a 
peaceful solution. [Finlan 2004 pp.22-26] Following Slovene Independence, the 
Yugoslav Army started an initial attempt of regaining control of its territory which 
failed due to the preparedness and unity of the Slovenian Troops. The ensuing war 
lasted for 10 days and led to only minor casualties. The brief and rather uneventful 
war can be explained by its highly homogenous population which unanimously 
backed the move for Independence. [Glenny 1996 pp.62-98] 
The wars which ensured in Croatia and Bosnia were different in both nature and 
scale. Both Croatia and Bosnia contained large minority groups of other Yugoslav 
ethnicities. In the latter almost half of the population consisted of Serbs and Croats. 
As war broke out this minorities aligned themselves with their “ethnic” government 
and formed illegitimate splinter states within the territory of Bosnia and Croatia. [Lukic 
1996 pp. 200–210] The most notorious example is the still existing Republika Srpska 
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in Bosnia but there was also the Croat backed Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna 
and the Republika Srpska Kraijna in Croatia. Both Croatia and Serbia had interest in 
parts of Bosnia’s territory and therefore utilised their ethnic population to carve up the 
country among themselves. [Finlan 2004 pp.26-56] At the height of the conflict 
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban came 
to an agreement to partition the whole territory of Bosnia between the two entities. 
[Lukic 1996 pp. 210–212] These were eventually to be incorporated into Serbia and 
Croatia proper. The so called Graz Agreement was later presented by Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman as a solution to the conflict but was rejected by the 
International Community as it eradicated the Bosnian nation and left the Bosnian 
Muslims (Bosniacs) at the will of ethno nationalistic leaders. [Lukic 1996 pp. 210–212] 
From the outset the Bosniacs found themselves in an unfavourable situation. As the 
war progressed, they were constantly losing ground with only limited means of 
defending themselves. Due to the weapons embargo imposed on the whole of 
Yugoslavia, Bosnian forces were unable to obtain weaponry from abroad. [Malcom 
1996 pp.234-253] As most of the former Yugoslav Army was situated in Serbia, it 
was left with the majority of arms, which they freely distributed to the Bosnian Serbs. 
The Croats, having expected at least a minor conflict in response to Independence, 
had secured a much better arsenal prior to the war and were therefore not 
immediately affected by the embargo. [Malcom 1996 pp.234-256] The Bosnians 
however were left with only minimal resources and no way of obtaining supplies. In 
hindsight many scholars have criticised the IC for its decision to keep the embargo 
intact, seeing that one side to the conflict was profusely disadvantaged. The IC’s 
reasoning was that lifting the ban and providing supplies to the Bosniacs would 
prolong the conflict and ultimately help no one. [Finlan 2004 pp.26-56] Once the 
scale of destruction committed by the Bosnian Serbs became apparent, the embargo 
was lifted but at this point Karadzic had already captured 70 % of Bosnian territory 
and solidified his defences.  
The war in Bosnia was special in many ways. Until this day the actual status of the 
war remains disputed. Especially Serbians are quick to categorise it as a classic Civil 
War on the basis that all perpetrators were holding the same citizenship. Opposing 
this view, some analysts have argued that the proven involvement of both the 
Serbian and the Croatian Government, allows for the conflict to be classified as a war 
amongst nations. [Malcom 1996 pp.234-256]  However as both governments were 
11 
 
never involved in any fighting and officially only played a logistical and supplying role, 
this classification does not fit comfortably either. In fact the war in Bosnia most likely 
constitutes a hybrid of the two classifications mentioned above. [Calic 1996 pp. 98-
121] 
The International Community attempted to foster a peace process throughout the 
course of the conflict. There were essentially three attempts at coming to an 
agreement over the future makeup of a Bosnian state. One prior to the war and two 
during the war. The key problem, preventing a peaceful resolution of the conflict, 
were the different interests and aims of the three ethnicities regarding the future of 
the country. Whereas the Bosniacs aimed at retaining Bosnia as a centralised multi 
ethnic state, the Serbs and Croats favoured the creation of a federation or even a 
confederation of three autonomous states with independent local governments. 
[Finlan 2004 pp.79-83] 
Originally the European Community fostered an agreement which foresaw a division 
of the country based on a cantonal system resembling modern day Switzerland. Each 
ethnic group would gain its separate Canton with an autonomous administration. A 
Central Government was to bridge the three cantonal authorities on matters of 
national importance. [Finlan 2004 pp.83-91]  Although all parties approved the 
proposal, they were unable to agree on internal borders of the new cantons. The EC 
tried to introduce a compromise in which the Bosniacs would receive 45% of the 
territory, the Serbs 42.5% and the Croats 12.5%. However the ethnic composition of 
the territory was so diverse that under the EU proposal more than 50% of Serbs and 
Croats would have lived outside their respective canton. [Calic 1996] The peace 
agreement highlighted the fact that due to the population make up a partition of the 
country along ethnic lines was unviable. Scholars have argued that it was here that 
the Bosnian leaders realised that in order to achieve their plans, the whole societal 
structure of the country had to be changed. [Glenny 2000 pp.634-663 ] It paved the 
way for the wide spread ethnic cleansing campaigns that were executed during the 
war. Especially the Bosnian Serbs were driven by the idea of creating a territory as 
homogenous as possible. [Lampe 2000 pp.365-416] German Historian Marie - Janine 
Calic therefore openly criticised the EC for sticking to the principle of ethnicity as the 
basis for a federal system. She acknowledges the Community’s desire to prevent an 
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armed conflict but assess that by insisting on the ethnic principle, they may be 
partially responsible for to the subsequent ethnic cleansing. [Calic 1996 pp.186-212] 
Following the rejection of the plan, large scale war broke out across the country. The 
Croats initially sided with the Bosnians as the Serbs constituted a common enemy for 
both groups. In both countries they had proclaimed independent Republics and 
picked up arms in order to create a uniform territory, which could later be 
incorporated into Yugoslavia (eg.Serbia) proper. [Lampe 2000 pp.365-416] They 
were unofficially backed in their endeavour by the Serbian government, which 
supplied them not only with ammunition but also troops. The alliance between Croats 
and Bosnians was fragile, especially since the former also laid claim to some of 
Bosnia’s territory. [Glenny 1996 pp. 243-295] Once it became apparent that the 
Bosnian Serbs proved far too powerful to resist, the Croats swapped allegiance and 
struck a deal with the Serbs over the partition of Bosnia’s territory. This led to the 
proclamation of a Croatian Republic within Bosnia, which followed the same logic as 
its Serbian predecessor, namely to occupy territory and integrate it into Croatia. 
[Lampe 2000 pp.365-416] These unexpected developments in the war led to a 
second attempt at an agreement on the future of Bosnia. This attempt was drafted by 
former British Foreign Secretary, Lord David Owen and former US Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance. The so called Vance-Owen Plan divided Bosnia-Hercegovina into ten 
cantons. These cantons would run weakly along ethnic lines but in general allowed 
for the retention of the multi-ethnic makeup of the state. [Calic 1996 pp.186-212] For 
that very reason it was heavily criticised in the media, for offering no real solution to 
the problem as the ethnic question would remain unsettled. Most analysts at the time 
argued that a Bosnian state, not offering a proper division of power between the 
ethnic groups, was not workable in the long run. [Calic 1996 pp.186-212] Given the 
reality, that ethnic segregation did not ease the tensions in the country but rather 
reinvigorated them and moreover contributed to the political standstill, many 
adversaries of the plan have subsequently retracted and altered their views on the 
plan. Vance-Owens proposal would have preserved the ethnic diversity of Bosnia 
instead of artificially creating ethnic homogenous regions. The Plan was endorsed by 
the European Community, the Serbian Government, and the Bosnian Croats but 
rejected by the Americans, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniacs. The Americans 
assumed the proposed state to be unworkable for reasons stated above, the Bosnian 
Serbs would have had to accept the deconstruction of the Republic Srpska and the 
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Bosniacs had to forgo the idea of a fully unified state. [Glenny 2000 pp.634-663] 
Whereas Bosniacs and Americans eventually came round in accepting the deal, the 
Bosnian Serbs, being in a strong position, refused to back down. Even the increasing 
pressure by the Serbian Government proved to be ineffective in convincing Karadzic 
to give into the proposal.  
The war continued for another 2 years during which the Bosnian Serb army managed 
to capture about 70% of Bosnia’s territory. The Bosniaks space of influence was 
reduced to Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. The Serbs began engaging in ethnic 
cleansing in order to homogenise the population of important cities and thereby 
solidify their claim to the territory. [Donia 1994 pp.220-282] Ethnic cleansing 
campaigns were largely conducted by violent means. It saw the civilian population of 
other ethnic groups being removed from certain areas by means of murder, forceful 
deportation, intimidation and deliberate destruction of property. The practice 
cumulated in the genocides of Srebrenica and Zepa, were the majority of its male 
population was murdered after the city had already been captured. [Malcom 1996 
pp.234-253] The inability of UN forces to prevent the atrocities was latter highly 
debated in Western media and reinforced the International engagement in Bosnia 
after the war.   
As the Serbs were on the verge of capturing the whole of Bosnia, eventually the 
Bosniacs and Croats hesitantly agreed to cooperate and develop a proposal that 
would allow for the cessation of war. They initially agreed on the creation of a 
Federation which would span 51% of Bosnia’s territory. In it Bosniacs and Croats 
would share power based on a Cantonal system. [Glenny 2000 pp.634-663 ] The rest 
of the territory would be given to the Bosnian Serbs, allowing them the perpetuation 
of the Republika Srpska as an autonomous part of the Bosnian state. The 
compromise was mediated by Russian, American, French, German and British 
diplomats and positively received by all neighbouring states. It already outlined a 
system of power sharing which was later adopted in the Dayton accords. [Lukic 1996 
pp.250-260] However the Bosnian Serbs, occupying a majority of Bosnia’s territory, 
were unwilling to agree to the proposal. Karadzic was convinced that he could 
conquer the rest of Bosnia and make the Republika Srpska the legitimate successor 
of the Bosnian State. Despite all the efforts of neighbouring governments to change 
his mind, the war continued for another 4 months during which the Bosnian Serbs 
were under constant bombardment by NATO Troops. This eventually stopped their 
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advance and forced Karadzic to agree to the deal. [Finlan 2004 pp.79-83 ] The 
Dayton Peace Accords represented a massive victory for the Bosnian Serbs which 
with only 35% of population were practically given half of the territory. They were also 
awarded with the cities of Srebrenica and Zule, places where Karadzic’s army 
committed the worst atrocities of the war. Retrospectively scholars have argued that 
the biggest achievement of the Treaty was the ability to force the different groups to 
live together peacefully in one state and prevent the continuation of conflict. [Lampe 
2000 pp.365-416] However it feel short of being a fair and balanced agreement. It 
created a political system which was unsuitable for creating stable democratic 
institutions as it was too concerned with ensuring the segregation of the different 
ethnic groups. This in turn has also rendered the reconciliation of society impossible. 
[Finlan 2004 pp.83-91] 
This ends the short synopsis of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflict 
that took over the whole region. The conflict did not stop with Dayton as it spread to 
Kosovo and thereafter Macedonia and Montenegro. The War in Bosnia presented the 
first major conflict on European soil since the end of World War II. Although its 
magnitude was concentrated to a very small area, its impacts have not been less 
devastating. Its development had severe implications not just for the region itself, but 
also the European Community. The latter had to accept its failure in preserving peace 
in the region and was henceforth forced to find a solution to the diversity in foreign 
policy objectives across the Community.  In a way the failure experienced in Bosnia 
contributed to the decision to create a common foreign policy which in turn lead to the 
creation of the External Action Service. It is important to note that, although 
representation in the literature and the media often tends to be slightly more biased 
towards on  side, in fact all conflicting parties have engaged in despicable practices 
vis á vis members of the other ethnic groups. Due to its wider impact, the Serbian 
atrocities are much more known but Croatian and Bosnian armed forces alike have 
committed war crimes, albeit on a much smaller scale. For instance Croats shelled 
parts of the city of Mostar in order to rid themselves of its Bosniac population. 
Similarly the Bosniac armed forces committed atrocities against Serbian Civilians 
living in the areas in and around Sarajevo. To say that one group is more responsible 
than another misses the point and is largely what fuels the continuing resentment of 
the ethnicities today and effectively prevents a normalisation of relationships.  
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As I have said on the outset, an understanding of the history of Bosnia is useful to 
comprehend the current political situation in the country. In it we can identify patterns 
of behaviour which Bosnian society has developed in response to the country’s 
turbulent history. For centuries the country was the plaything of major regional and 
global powers which have led to the creation of a culturally and religiously diverse 
society. It comes as no surprise that Sarajevo often receives the label of Jerusalem 
of Europe in recognition of its role as a melting pot of Muslim, Christian (Orthodox 
and Catholics) and Jewish believes. The powers that have ruled over the territory of 
modern day Bosnia have also contributed to the identification of people across 
religious lines. Both under Ottoman and Habsburg rule the citizens did not possess 
any form of representation Vis á Vis the authorities. [Malcom 1994 pp. 43-51, 136-
156] They were however free to choose their religious belief. Hence religious 
communities became the prime advocate for the interests of their followers.  Albeit 
the relations between religious groups was mostly amicable, a certain degree of 
mistrust has always existed. This has to do with the fact that throughout history, 
always one of the ethnic groups occupied a somewhat preferential position in society 
in relation to the other two. The Bosniacs under the Ottomans, the Croats under the 
Habsburgs and the Serbs under the Karađorđevićs. [Donia pp.13-35, 93-136] The 
SFRY, for the first time managed to solve this problem, as under Communism, a 
secular lifestyle was promoted and ethnic groups were encouraged to identify with 
their profession or social class rather than their religion. However in the advent of the 
Yugoslav breakup, religious affiliation started to re-emerge as a mode of delimiting 
oneself from others and was swiftly utilised by political elites in order to secure their 
access to power. [Lampe 2000 pp.332-365] 
Alongside religious affiliation the other important feature of Bosnian society are the 
centuries-old community structures, through which people tend to identify themselves 
more with their village or region than with their country. Albeit this phenomena is not 
unheard of in other parts of Europe, it becomes strikingly more important in Central 
Europe and especially the Western Balkans. Bosnia, for most of its history lay at the 
crossroads of influential Empires (Habsburg, Ottoman, and Serbian) and frequently 
changed possessor. Due to this volatility in allegiance, society developed around the 
only constant variable. Communities went on to developed value systems which 
reached across ethnic or religious lines. [Aybet et al. 2011] This societal focus around 
community life has led to a certain short sightedness regarding general elections. 
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[Galijas 2008 pp. 413-454 ] Often the overall situation in the country is not taken into 
account and citizens align themselves with the village consensus. This can help us in 
understanding the reasons of why nationalistic parties, which contribute to the 
precarious situation in the country, still receive comfortable majorities. Rational 
thought tells us that voters should punish their representatives for failing to move the 
country forward, but if we take into account that a large part of Bosnian society will 
make their decision based on local rather than national considerations , it suddenly 
becomes easier to understand why certain parties are getting re-elected.  
If we regard the history of the country we can see that it has been dominated by the 
interplay of religious and communal affiliation. Depending on the situation, one 
affiliation has been more prominent than the other. As a rule of thumb one can say 
that during times of peace, community dominated over religious affiliation and the 
other way round in times of conflict. This would lead to the question, why the 
cessation of war did not bring a normalisation of ethnic relations in Bosnia. As we 
have established above, the war changed the ethnic makeup of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Prior to the conflict, ethnicities were scattered around the country, 
which made it difficult to carve up the country in the first place. Due to the exhaustive 
ethnic cleansing campaigns conducted by all sides, the ethnic makeup has drastically 
changed. Nowadays a clear division exists between the different ethnicities as 
villages tend to be mostly inhabited by people from the same ethnic group. Therein 
lies the answer to the above. I would argue that for the Bosnian population at large, 
the cessation of war also meant a return to community affiliation. However these new 
communities are now so precisely segregated that religious affiliation largely equals 
community affiliation. Therefor reconciliation of society is made exceptionally difficult. 
As we will see in the following section, the Dayton Agreement has reinforced this 
segregation of society as a means of keeping the peace. As we will see shortly this 
has made the Bosnian Political System unworkable and contributed to the political 
deadlock that we are experiencing today. 
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,, On paper, Dayton represented a good agreement; it ended the war and established a single 
multi-ethnic country. However the results of the international effort to implement Dayton 
will determine its true place in history’’7 
 
 
As we concluded in the past chapter, the Dayton Agreement was successful in 
enforcing peace while maintaining the territorial integrity of the country. This in itself 
was an almost impossible achievement which demanded a carefully drafted 
convention which acknowledged the interest of all parties involved and was able to 
balance these interests against each other. Thus Dayton provided a framework to 
establish and maintain peace but was conceivably unsuitable to establish democratic 
institutions, let alone a functioning political system. Nevertheless almost twenty years 
after the agreement has been signed, the country is still unable to move on from the 
consensus reached at Dayton.  
The current political system has become a burden on both society and the state. As a 
staggering 60 % of state money is spent on bureaucracy it is unsurprisingly that the 
country has improved only marginally in the past twenty years. This is to the 
detriment of the local population, who have become somewhat indifferent to the 
development of the country. Although last year’s short lived protests, painfully 
exhibits the desire for change within Bosnian society, years of ethno nationalistic 
politics have made this ever more difficult to achieve. 
2.1: The contemporary political system of Bosnia 
 
As a result of Dayton, Bosnia today is a largely decentralised State, with a very weak 
central government. The country is formally divided into two non-sovereign entities: 
the Serb ruled Republica Srpska and the Bosniak/Croat controlled Federacija Bosne I 
Hercegovina. It is here at the regional level where the true source of power within 
Bosnia lies. [Laudes 2009] Although officially subordinated to a central government, 
any major political change in the country, stands or falls at the will of the regional 
politicians. 
                                                          
7
 Richard Holbrooke following the signing of the Dayton Agreement.  
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The Republic Srpska makes up almost half of the country´s territory and includes 
large parts of Bosnia which traditionally where Bosniac or Croatian territory but 
whose native population has been removed as a result of ethnic cleansing. [Chandler 
2000 pp.66-90] Although the government in Banka Luka has committed itself to 
facilitate the return of former expellees, its persistent ethno nationalistic rhetoric has 
discouraged the majority of people from returning. [http://www.internal-
displacement.org 2014] 
The RS also created and ratified its own constitution which ironically is based on the 
adherence and protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. 
Seeing that the foundation of the RS was based on the principle of segregation and 
inclusion, this appraisal of human dignity appears somewhat out of place. [Bose 2002 
pp 41-89] Moreover the constitution entails generous welfare provisions for all its 
citizens including benefits to children and elderly, free healthcare and functioning 
public services. Again the reality is somewhat different as an estimated 90% of the 
Republic’s population lives in poverty, while the administration is almost bankrupt and 
therefore in no state of taking care of these vulnerable parts of society. The Indian 
politiologist Sumantra Bose has called this gap between rights proclaimed and rights 
granted, to be amongst the largest credibility gaps of any written state constitution. 
[Bose 2002 pp.41-89] 
 
Whereas the RS is under the rule of one ethnic group, which makes administration 
relatively straight forward, things become more complex in the Federacija were two 
ethnic groups have to share power. To ensure a just distribution of power, the region 
has been further divided into 10 cantons, each of which features its own local 
government. [Tzifakis 2008] This means that each canton has its own independent 
administration with legislative, executive and judicative rights. All decision making 
powers which are not explicitly granted to the entity government are automatically 
assigned to the Communal Government. [Laudes 2009] 
Moreover should a Village’s ethnic composition not represent the ethnic composition 
of its respective canton, it is entitled to have certain rights transferred to it by the 
cantonal government. [Bose 2002] 
Within the regional government all institutions have to be made up in equal parts by 
both ethnic groups and the President and Vice President of any public office may not 
come from the same group.  [Galijas 2008 pp.413- subsq] 
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Lastly, the City of Brčko belongs to neither of the two entities but constitutes a 
Special Administrative Region again featuring its own local administration. It was 
created in 2000 after it became apparent that both entities were unable to find an 
agreement on who was to govern the area.[Parish 2009 pp.28-55] The Serbs need 
Brčko as a gateway, linking the two parts of the RS and the Bosniak/Croats need 
Brčko in order to have access to the Danube. Officially both entities share the 
administration in the region but in practice the local government acts relatively 
independent. .[Parish 2009 pp.118-135] 
 
All these different administrations are bridged by a Central Authority which consists of 
the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. 
On paper all regional governments are subordinated to and controlled by the Centre. 
[Dziewulska 2010] However in practice the national government is unable to 
effectively challenge regional leaders. This comes from the setup of the central 
institutions themselves, which provide ways for regional leaders to effectively 
challenge any decision taken at the national level. [Galijas 2008 pp.413- subsq] 
The Presidency is made up by three individuals, one from each ethnic group, which 
together hold the office for four years. On a rotary basis each individual takes charge 
of the office for eight months and remains in a consolatory position for the remaining 
time. [Batt 2007 pp.72-90] According to Article V of the Dayton Constitution, the 
Presidency is responsible for the Foreign Relations of the country. As such the 
President appoints Ambassadors, represents the country in International 
Organisations and negotiates treaties with 3rd parties.8  
The Parliamentary Assembly consists of two Chambers, the House of 
Representatives (HoR) and the House of People (HoP) respectively. Both 
parliamentary chambers have identical legislative powers which unnecessarily 
duplicates potential for disruption and hence complicates the legislative procedure. 
[Bieber 2012] The primary function of the HoP is to represent communities and allow 
for the protection of their interests. In order to do so it features a vital interest clause, 
which states that any entity may block any piece of legislation if it deems it to be 
harmful to the interest of its population. [Dayton Article 4.3] However the constitution 
fails to define the term vital interest, which leaves it to the appreciation of the 
Constitutional Court to decide whether a decision was justified. Due to the Court’s 
                                                          
8
 http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/article.php?pid=833&kat=518&pkat=500  
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ability to overturn a veto, it is rarely used but more often used as leverage. [Sebastián 
2007]    
However there is another way for politicians to hinder decision making through the so 
called entity veto. It states that for a law to pass two thirds of MPs in both chambers 
of Parliament need to support it. There is no active remedy against an entity veto and 
as long as no compromise can be found any decision is halted and delayed. 
Depending on the issue, agreements are often hard to find and the 2/3 ruled has 
delayed many important decisions for prolonged periods of time. [Bieber 2012] 
Moreover through the existence of two Chambers with equal competencies, the 
potential veto points are duplicated making it even more difficult to achieve 
consensus. 
The Council of Ministers or the Cabinet is appointed by its President, who is prior 
nominated by the Presidency and elected by Parliament. As the executive branch of 
the central government, it is responsible for a variety of policy areas that have been 
conferred from the regional to the national level. [Dayton Article 5.4] Today the 
federal government is exclusively responsible for Foreign, Monetary and Customs 
Policy and has extensive competencies in the areas of Immigration, Nationality and 
Transportation policy. [Dayton Article 3] However even when decision making should 
actually happen at the national level, in practice important decisions are still made at 
the regional level. For instance in the field of foreign policy, the regions have been 
given the right to sign agreements with states and International Organisations which 
are valid under International Law. [Calic 1996 pp.242-263] 
The Constitutional Court, the country’s supreme judicial organ, represents the only 
working Central institution in Bosnia. Ironically it is also the only institution in which 
non Bosnians play a central role as 3 of its 12 judges come from outside the Region 
and are appointed by the European Court of Human Rights. As the court is operating 
by majority vote rather than consensus, it has been much less prone to deadlock and 
therefore useful to settle long standing disputes. [Bose 2002 pp.41-89] 
 
As we can see from the above the emphasis on ethnic segregation found in the 
Dayton Accords has led to a highly complex political structure which consists of more 
than fourteen governments, over 100 ministries and 14 parliamentary assemblies 
with legislative competencies and far reaching Veto rights. The federal level, created 
to bridge between the various regional governments, is a weakly structured body with 
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barely any competencies, no property rights and hermetically concerned with the 
division of power between ethnic groups. In fact the design of the political system in 
Bosnia is the crucial problem as it promotes rather than ceases conflict. [Dziewulska 
2010] Basing the system on the ethnic division of society, rather than mutual 
cooperation, has engrossed the gap between the groups rather than closed it. The 
system created under Dayton can therefore be held directly responsible for the 
ethnically driven politics which dominate modern Bosnian Politics. [Laudes 2009] The 
political elite has become increasingly obsessed with retaining the Status Quo simply 
because it offers the easiest way to hang on to power. By retaining the ethnic division 
of society, the ethnic card can be freely abused in order to gather votes from a 
disillusioned electorate. [Galijas 2008 pp.413- subsq] 
The absence of common social services such as healthcare, education or defence 
has further weakened societal cohesion within the country. For instance in the 
absence of a common educational curriculum, the regional administrations are free to 
implement their own syllabus within their region. [Tanovic 2013] This has negatively 
affected reconciliation efforts as the history of the country is told differently depending 
on the institution that is visited. The city of Travnik9 offers a vivid example of this. The 
city’s main secondary educational institution has been cut down in the middle with 
one side being reserved for Bosniak students, whereas the other receives Croatian 
students. Even the schools playground has been bisected with a wire separating the 
children from each other. [Tanovic 2013]  
 
The strict insistence on the ethnic principle also has a detrimental effect on minority 
rights in the country. In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the Case 
Finic and Sejdic vs. Bosnia. Mr Finic and Mr Sejdic, who were of Jewish and Romani 
background respectively, had accused the country of violating their human rights by 
excluding them from high ranking political offices on the grounds of their ethnicity. 
Non constitutional people in Bosnia are prevented by law from running for both the 
Presidency and the House of Peoples. [Bieber 2012] The Court eventually ruled that 
the Electoral Law of the Country as well as the Constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina 
was deemed to be in breach of Human Rights and it issued an order to amend this 
problem.10 The decision again highlighted the shortcomings of the Dayton 
                                                          
9
 http://s2.pticica.com/foto/0000800891_l_0_i8yepp.jpg  
    http://www.michelleparsons.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/two-schools-under-one-roof.jpg 
10
 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"dmdocnumber":["860268"],"itemid":["001-96491"]  
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Constitution and showed that in a political system where even the constituent people 
are not at ease with each other, the protection of minority rights becomes 
increasingly difficult.  
2.2: Constitutional Reform 
 
The Dayton Accords were primarily the work of US lawyers and foremost aimed at 
balancing power between its constitutional ethnic groups. [Bose 2002 pp.204-246] 
It carried the spirit of its time but has always been unsuitable as a constitution for a 
modern nation state. It was never voted upon in Bosnian Parliament and henceforth 
never officially ratified. [Aybet et al 2011] It was thought that a proper constitution 
would be drawn up and agreed upon in the immediate post-war environment but this 
soon turned out to be impossible as the national leaders openly embraced the ethno 
nationalistic component featured in Dayton and became reluctant to agree upon any 
real changes to the latter. [Galijas 2008 pp.413- subsq] In the absence of a fleshed 
out constitution, the agreement still acts as a substitute. 
For ten years the priority of outside actors lay in building up the institutional setup 
created under Dayton and they only marginally concerned themselves with the 
development of a proper constitution. As the Dayton setup suited the needs of 
national elites just fine, they themselves saw no need in constitutional change either. 
[Laudes 2009] A decade later, the shortcomings of Dayton and its institutional setup 
became apparent with any real change having to be enforced from outside while 
national institutions proved to be increasingly fragile and unable to control the 
regional elites. This realisation shifted the emphasis towards constitutional change, 
which was thought of being able to reform state institutions and thereby break the 
institutional deadlock.  
There has been a wide range of literature on the nature of any constitutional reform 
and recommendations have been issued by both State actors such as the Venice 
Commission, as well as independent think tanks such as FRIDE or the ESI. They all 
identify similar key areas that any credible reform should be addressing. 
 
Firstly there is a need to reduce the provisions that are aimed at safeguarding the 
interests of all constitutional people. Most of all this means the modification of the 
Vital Interest Veto, responsible for many blocking decisions in Parliament. The 
Dayton framework fails to establish a clear definition of what constitutes a vital 
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interest which leaves it very much open to interpretation. [Venice Commission 2005] 
This insecurity means that the preventive effect of the veto is much more significant 
than its actual use in Parliament. In the past the Veto or the threat of thereof has 
been used by entity delegates in order to hinder and halt political progress. 
[Sebastian 2007] In the light of EU accession, which requires a large amount of 
legislation being passed, it becomes even more pressing that the Entity Veto is 
modified in order to allow for a smooth harmonisation process. The Venice 
Commission recommended that a feasible definition should only focus on rights of 
particular importance to an ethnic group such as language and culture. [Venice 
Commission 2005] 
Florian Bieber from the University of Graz takes this assessment one step further and 
argues that the whole setup of Parliament should be changed in order to allow for a 
better legislative. This would mean the reduction of powers vested in the 2nd 
Chamber and a remedy for the Entity Veto in the House of Representative. Moreover 
he suggests diversifying the make-up of the Houses of People, including minority 
groups and moving away from the strict ethnic segregation developed under the 
Dayton accords. Bieber believes that by doing so the Country would not just move 
towards complying with the Finic – Sedjic ruling but also seriously improve the 
working of its Parliament per se. [Bieber 2012] 
Secondly the role of the Presidency should be revised. At current, the Presidency is 
split between three people, one from each ethnic group. It works side by side with a 
Council of Ministers, whose responsibilities and tasks often overlap. In the light of this 
the triple presidency seems particularly excessive. It was therefore recommended to 
transfer legitimacy from the presidency to the council, thereby abolishing the 
presidential system in favour of a parliamentary system. Thereafter the President 
should be one person which is to be elected by Parliament. Special provisions may 
be made which regulate a rotary system with each ethnic group holding the position 
every 12 years. [Venice Commission 2005] However in the light of the ECHR’s ruling 
it may be advised to completely cut the ethnic requirement for the Presidency and 
make the position eligible to any Bosnian citizen. Given the relatively low numbers of 
minorities in the country, this would be merely a gesture in this regard but in terms of 
breaking up the ethnicity driven political system it could be considered an important 
development. 
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Thirdly any constitutional reform should also aim at reforming the electoral system as 
well.11 This means moving away from the present system which distinguishes not just 
between entities but also between ethnicity of voters. [Belloni 2006] All major 
institutions are elected based on the principle of ethnicity where Croats vote for 
Croatian representatives, Serbs for Serbian and Bosniacs for Bosniacs. [Belloni 
2006]This emphasis on ethnic affiliation as part of the political system reinforces the 
separation of society and hinders any reconciliation of the latter. It has also helped in 
creating a party system which is almost exclusively based on ethnicity and turned the 
same into the key political cleavage in the country. [Sebastian 2007] Although 
recently some moderate centrist parties have emerged in the country, still over half 
the parties identify themselves as nationalistic.12 
Lastly in order to ease the budgetary constraints, a permanent solution for the current 
division of power needs to be found. Ideally this would mean abandoning the entities 
in favour of administrative regions. [Venice Commission 2005] These regions would 
be based on geographic rather than ethnic composition. This in turn could also aid 
the resettlement of expellees in their original place of origin. However whereas 
Bosniacs and Croats have been largely found to be in favour reorganising the 
administration, the overwhelming majority of Serbs refuses to accept any agreement 
that would dismantle the Republika Srpska. [Venice Commission 2005] Alternatively 
efforts could be made to dismantle the Federation while retaining the RS. A majority 
of the financial constraints hail from the vast amount of Cantonal governments and 
their separate administrations. Therefor restructuring one of the entities would 
already help in easing budgetary pressure. If successful the regional restructuring 
could act as an example to the Serbian population in the country to do the same. 
However albeit theoretically possible, in reality the idea would be hard to realise.  
Even though relations between Bosniaks and Croats are better than between 
Serbians and Bosniaks, they are far from being amicable and deeply rooted 
suspicion persists on both sides. The Croats fear that by abolishing the cantonal 
system, their stake in the country would be diminished. The Bosniacs on the other 
hand fear that abandoning the Federacija while retaining the RS would mean a 
massive gain in influence for the Serbs, Vis á Vis the other two. 
 
                                                          
11
 http://www.izbori.ba/Documents/documents/English/Laws/Election_Law_of_BiH-eng.pdf  
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 http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/bosnia.html - Present Party Spectrum in Bosnia I Herzegovina 
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Since 2005 there have been three attempts at a constitutional reform, the most 
recent one in 2009.  
The most elaborated amongst those has been the so called April Package of 2006. 
Although it was heavily assisted from the outside, it was at large a domestically 
driven process and it was only once initial negotiations seemed promising that 
International Actors became engaged. [Sebastian 2007] It soon became apparent 
that differences between the ethnic groups were wide and the persisting distrust 
amongst the elites involved meant that none of them were particularly eager to make 
far reaching concessions. The negotiations on the April Package were also set at a 
rather unsuitable time. With elections being only six months away, most politicians 
were increasingly concerned to cater to their electoral base. [Sebastian 2007] 
Therefor the negotiations were far from fruitful and the resulting package was very 
poor. However it was endorsed by both the EU and the US as it was regarded as a 
first step into the right direction and would allow Bosnia to ease its way into the EU.  
The Package, nevertheless failed to pass in Parliament which can be attributed to 
two points. Firstly, the package offered only cosmetic solutions but failed to provide 
an effective solution for the status of the RS as well as the entity voting. Secondly the 
adoption of the April Package was believed to imply the ratification of the Dayton 
Constitution and therefor an approval for retaining the status quo. [Hayes et all 2006] 
Another major point for the failure of the April Package was the role played by outside 
actors. There was a sincere lack of unity amongst actors involved which contributed 
to the challenging negotiations. Due to the diverse set of recommendations being 
issued, local politicians just utilised whatever suited their needs best. [Bieber 2010] 
Whereas the EU followed a hands off approach, leaving local politicians to find a 
compromise themselves, the US got heavily engaged, at times enforcing rather than 
recommending solutions.  [Sebastian 2007] However both were interested in a swift 
solution for the country’s problems rather than a drawn out process involving a 
variety of actors. This obsession with creating a quick fix led to the exclusion of 
Parliament, Civil Society and the Judiciary, which meant that the April Package was 
never likely to succeed as it disregarded the opinions of large parts of Bosnian 
society.  [Bieber 2010] 
 
After the rejection of the April Package there have been two more attempts at 
constitutional reform, which more or less followed the same pattern and were 
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therefore just as unsuccessful in achieving its objectives. Both reform efforts foremost 
benefited the regional elite as they exploited the open division between the EU and 
US and largely used the process to gather electoral points. [Sebastian 2011] 
 
2.3: The need for constitutional overhaul 
 
Ever since the failure of the Burmit Process, five years ago, there has been no real 
effort at a Constitutional Reform. This means that as of now, the country still does not 
comply with the ECHR’s ruling and Parliament is still in lockdown. Reasons for the 
failure of constitutional reform are numerous and mostly have to do with the political 
system created under Dayton. The ethnic division of politics and society has created 
a behemoth that has only grown stronger of the years and it has become increasingly 
hard to implement any change. The deadlock the country is in is self-inflicted and has 
caughted society in a loop where various factors reinforce certain behaviours which 
in itself reinforce the political standstill. By hermetically segregating society according 
to ethnic affiliation, Dayton has aided the development of a political system that uses 
ethnicity as its most important political cleavage.  
Political elites have responded to this development by utilising nationalism in order to 
raise support within their electorate. Lack of progress in the country is generally 
blamed on the various other “ethnicities” in the country which albeit offering electoral 
success, further divides society.  
This tactic is however not unique to Bosnia but widespread across Politics. In the 
same way many European governments have utilised the EU as a scapegoat for 
what are inherently domestic problems. As large parts of civil society knows very little 
about EU decision making or the institutional setup of the Union, it becomes 
increasingly easy for politicians to blame their own shortcomings on Brussels. 
Similarly most Bosnians grow up in homogenised communities and therefore have 
very little knowledge about the other groups living within their country. This is 
especially true for people living in the RS, which for most parts has very little contact 
with either Bosniaks or Croatians.  
However this practice comes at a cost as it increases the hostility of locals towards 
the “others” which are perceived to be the culprit of all their problems. Just as the EU 
population has become increasingly Eurosceptic, the Bosnian society has become 
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increasingly hostile against each other. This in turn increases the perceived need for 
a segregated political system, decreasing the potential for institutional change.  
 
In order to break this reinforcing circle, a complete overhaul of the current system is 
inevitable. This means not just changing the constitution but completely restructuring 
the administration and existing institutions. In fact scholars such as Bieber have 
emphasised that institutional reform should be prioritised over constitutional change 
as only by breaking the current administrative division across ethnic lines can we 
hope to obtain a more stable political system. [Bieber 2010] Constitutional change by 
itself would be a step in this direction but would eventually fall short of changing the 
political division of the country.  
 
In order to ultimately create a workable Bosnian state, the current practice of ethnic 
segregation must be reduced to a minimum and be replaced by an all embracing 
political system which encourages interrelation between different ethnic groups. By 
increasing the exchange across different groups, this will raise awareness in society 
and ultimately lead to the demise of current practices. [Bieber 2010] [Sebastian 2011] 
[Dziewulska 2010] 
Personally I also think that a unified educational system, that does not separate 
ethnic groups and allows for intercultural exchange, must be one of the priorities in 
order to break the reinforcing cycle of ethno nationalism.  A unified educational 
curricula also allows for a uniform history of the Bosnian War to develop. This is 
needed in order for all ethnic groups to accept their groups’ involvement in the 
conflict and offer an important step towards reconciliation. The current practice of 
upholding ones ethnicity’s innocence while putting the blame on the other two ethnic 
groups, is outdated and needs to be addressed. 
 
I am well aware that this process is far from simple and it will need the support from 
all local elites in order to be successful. This will be especially hard to achieve simply 
because politicians benefit from the present constitution. They will therefore be rather 
hesitant in reforming the political system. Hence any effort in this regard will have to 
come from civil society itself. The role of initiating this bottom up process may fall to 
International Actors, especially the European Union. 
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After having established the groundwork for our discussion by first analysing the 
historical background and henceforth discussing the current political system, we can 
now turn our attention to the engagement of the International Community in Bosnia. 
Involvement in the country has for most parts come from two sources, the UN and 
trough this the United States and the European Union. Especially the latter, having 
failed to prevent the atrocities during the war, had a clear incentive of making the 
country work. The Union has often titillated Bosnia to be an exclusively European 
matter, rejecting the at times heavy involvement of the United States. As we have 
seen in the past chapter the US and the EU have not always been seeing eye to eye 
on Bosnia. Whereas the latter believed in letting locals lead the process at their own 
speed, the US was mainly interested in a top down process that would shield quick 
results. International Involvement has increased drastically over the years, which is 
why scholars have started calling Bosnia a defacto protectorate of the International 
Community. As we will see, this criticism is not unfounded. Most changes in the 
country can be attributed to the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or to EU led state building efforts. The local elite has long since 
accustomed to the interference by outside actors and effectively used them in order 
to further their own goals. Especially the HR has often been used by the elites as 
both a scapegoat and a conveyor of interests. 
EU engagement has often been criticised for being needlessly complicated which has 
robed it of the potential of having a sincere impact. Moreover the endless flexibility of 
the Unions conditionality approach has played its own part in diminishing the EUs 
influence in the country.   
Currently there has been the proclamation of a new approach headed by the British 
and German governments jointly. Its aim is nothing short of reviving the stalled 
Accession process and return Bosnia on the path to EU Membership. 
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3.1: The Office of the High Representative: 
The Guardian of Dayton 
 
Quando uno inconveniente e cresciuto o in uno stato o contro a uno stato, e più salutifero partito 
temporeggiarlo che urtarlo
13
 
 
The Office of the High Representative has been the tool through which the 
implementation of the Dayton Constitution has been ensured. However, so far any of 
the multiple Office holders has failed to significantly advance the institutional setup 
past the Consensus reached at Dayton and thereby allow for domestic ownership of 
all state institutions. This in itself has prolonged the lifespan of the office which was 
supposed to expire in 2002 but is currently still active. It has frequently been labelled 
the Guardian of Dayton, due to its perceived sole use of ensuring the observance of 
the Accords. It has been argued that therefore the Office can be incidentally held 
responsible for the vexing political situation which in itself tends to reaffirm the need 
for the HR. [Aybet et all 2011] 
 
In the light of the difficult civil implementation of the Peace Accords, the contracting 
parties requested the designation of a Representative to be the final arbiter in 
matters regarding the implementation of the Dayton Agreements.14 [Dayton Annex 10 
Article 1] Interestingly the HR does not carry a mandate by the UN Security Council, 
nor is he an official organ of the United Nations or any other International 
Organisation. He can therefore be  thought of as an instrument of the International 
Community.  
Initially the Office had no real executive powers attached to it, which made it 
increasingly hard to establish a sense of authority amongst the involved parties. The 
first officeholder Carl Bildt repeatedly complained about the diffuse situation in the 
country, given the multiplicity of international actors present on the ground. Those 
were more often than not holding very different opinions regarding the 
implementation of Dayton. [Laudes 2009] 
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 “When either within a State or against a State an inconvenience has been borne,  the safer course is to 
temporise, not to suppress it” Niccolo Machiavelli The Discourses Book 1: 33 
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This made Bildt’s assignment all the more difficult as local elites were irresponsive to 
his authority and in the light of the animosities being played out between International 
Actors, simply refused to cooperate with one another. Especially the officials from the 
RS were reluctant to work together with representatives from the other two ethnic 
groups.  
In order to counteract these developments and to attach a sense of authority to the 
Office, the HR was granted extensive executive powers by the 1997 Bonn 
Conference15 on the Implementation of Peace in Bosnia. This enabled the HR to 
issue legally binding legislation and remove high ranking officials from office. [Bonn 
Conclusions Article 11] Through the so called Bonn Powers, the Office was 
transformed from a weak consolidator into the highest authority in the Bosnian state.  
However it soon became clear that these fundamentally unchecked powers led to 
some serious drawbacks. 
 
Firstly, the frequent use of the Bonn Powers has directly affected the democratic 
structures in the country. Given these far reaching powers previous HR’s have been 
tempted to take decisions on behalf of the local elites, without giving them the 
necessary time to reach agreement amongst themselves. [Tzifakis 2008] 
For instance Carlos Westendorp charged the financial institutions of the Entity 
governments with creating a common currency for the country. Even under normal 
circumstance this process would take several months to complete. However after 
only two months Westendorp decided to forcefully introduce the Konvertible Mark on 
the ground that the local actors would be unable to come to a conclusion. [Laudes 
2009] Under the pretence of moving the country forward, much of the state building 
has been subsequently done by outside actors.  
Especially under Paddy Ashdown, large amounts of legislation, were effectively 
imposed on the country. Ashdown believed that given sufficient exposure to foreign 
laws and foreign institutions, locals would come to accept them as their own. He 
insisted that given sufficient time, the actual source of any  implemented decision 
would become unimportant. In his logic, he followed the reasoning previously 
employed by British Officials in Eastern Asia. This comparison was latter made by 
Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin in their article Travails of the European Raj, in which 
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they critically analysed the work of the OHR and warned that the Office had come to 
undermine democratic consolidation within the country. [Knaus et al 2003] 
 
Secondly the continuous practice of externally driven state building has had a 
profound effect on the local elite in the country. They have increasingly adjusted to 
the  idea of a third actor implementing difficult reforms on their behalf as it helped 
them in maintaining their power base in the country. [Tzifaksi 2008] They have 
therefore increasingly started to outsource potentially difficult tasks to the OHR. HR 
Wolfgang Petrisch recalled that during his term he was approached by local elites 
offering him a deal. They would agree to form a coalition government on the condition 
that he would agree to implement potentially painful economic reforms. [Knaus et al 
2003] This anecdote clearly highlights the perverse interdependency that has 
developed over the past twenty years. Externally driven state building has created an 
environment in which national actors have become both unable and unwilling to 
foster dialogue in order to strike political bargains. In the absence of accountability on 
the grounds of reforms implemented, national actors were free to continue abusing 
ethno nationalism to increase their electorate. [Dzihic et al 2011] Moreover the OHR 
offered an additional target on which to blame the increasing hardship suffered by 
many Bosnians. In short the OHR has facilitated the retention of an ethnicity 
dominated political environment.  
This finding is reinforced if we see that the OHR has effectively split the population in 
their opinion about its usefulness. The Venice Commission found that a large majority 
of Bosniacs and Croats support and even cherish the Office whereas the large 
majority of Serbs is strongly opposed to it. [Venice Commission 2005] This 
observation must come as no surprise given that the large majority of officials 
removed from Office were Bosnian Serbs. Moreover previous officeholders have 
been thought of trying to undermine the Republika Srpska and worked towards its 
dissolution. [Alic 2009] 
This strong division across ethnic lines with regards to  the usefulness of the Office 
seriously undermines reconciliation efforts and reinforces the present situation.  
 
Lastly, as a direct result of the increased unwillingness of local actors to cooperate, 
the country’s development at large has been left to the adjudication of a single 
person, which has been given the powers to rule without limits.  
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ESI director Gerald Knaus, compared the OHR, with the concept of the temporary 
dictator established by Niccolo Machiavelli in his Discourses. Machiavelli praised the 
Roman practice of appointing an individual who, in times of need,  could rule without 
limitations in order to save the Republic from destruction. However in his work the 
tenure of the ruler is restricted and his work is heavily scrutinised by the senate in 
order to avoid abuse. Knaus subsequently highlights that the OHR possess all the 
powers attributed to Machiavelli’s dictator but without any of the safety mechanisms 
attached. [Knaus et al 2003] 
This lack of accountability has seriously undermined the judgement of the Office and 
created a sense of arbitrariness. This has been most pronounced under the tenure of 
Ashdown. Many of his decisions have been incomprehensible for both local and 
foreign actors alike.  
For instance on one occasion Ashdown decided to discharge every single judge in 
the country from office just so they could subsequently reapply for their position. In 
doing so he hoped to achieve a judicial system less prone to corruption. However he 
disregarded the fact that most of the affected individuals already underwent a 
comprehensive review in the very same year, in which both their background and 
judicial track record had been scrutinised.  
Ashdown refused to include local actors in the process and also failed to substantiate 
his decision. [Knaus 2013] 
 
The EU has been largely divide over the perceived usefulness of the Office. Initially it 
was convinced of its importance and has at large facilitated the process of external 
state building based on the assumption that any progress is good progress. Given 
this initial success it was decided to merge the OHR with the EU Special 
Representative in order to emphasise the EU’s role in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
[Dziewulska 2010] 
Subsequently I would argue that we can observe a threefold process through which 
the OHR feel out of favour with Brussels.  
Following the merge of the two roles was Ashdown’s highly controversial term which 
sparked a wave of criticism which was not solely addressed to the HR but through its 
twinning with the EUSR also at the EU. The Unions stake in the state building 
process was scrutinised and heavily criticised by many outside actors.  For instance 
Jan Zielonka published his work Europe as Empire just at the End of Ashdowns term 
33 
 
in which he coined the phrase of Bosnia being the first sovereign nation being 
effectively ruled by Bureaucrats in Brussels. In his work Zielonka critically assessed 
the EU enlargement strategy in the past decade and also its advance into State 
Building. [Zielonka 2006] 
His assessment of the HRs role in Bosnia echoed the negative opinions published by 
the ESI and accused the EU of reaffirming the office’s authority by integrating it into 
the wider EU enlargement strategy. 
Thereafter the EU tried to address this criticism by pressuring subsequent 
Officeholders into assuming a more laissez fair attitude and attempting to promote 
domestic ownership.  
However the ECHR decision on Sejidic and Finic eventually brought the confirmation 
that external state building had failed and largely confirmed the critics in that the 
newfound institutions encouraged rather than terminated the Status Quo. This again 
led to widespread discussion on the EU’s involvement in the process. 
In an attempt to save face the EU eventually  decoupled the two positions and 
established their separate administration in Bosnia. [Laudes 2009] Ever since then, 
the large majority of EU member states have favoured to dispose of the OHR and 
have actively worked at undermining its standing in Bosnian society. Henceforth the 
offices competencies have been hollowed out and at the time of the 2008/2009 
Constitutional Reform, the HR was not even consulted. [Sebastian 2011] There is 
widespread acceptance nowadays that the OHR is way past its expiry date but due to 
its legacy dismantling the Office is not so easily done. 
As we have discussed above,  over half of the Bosnian population strongly believes 
that the Office is needed to act as a stabilising force between the different ethnic 
groups and that by removing the Office the weak state structures would be 
susceptible to the deliberation of ethnic politicians. Given this symbolic societal 
dependency, the Office cannot be easily dismantled as fear and suspicion embedded 
in all parts of Bosnian society, could have unsuspected consequence. This means a 
new role must be found for it.  
Initially this could mean relieving the Office of its legislative powers but retaining the 
dismissal rights. The latter should then be put under heavy scrutiny by local 
legislators and the Office should have to issue a reasoning should it decide to make 
use of the powers.   
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Moreover the OHR could be charged with reigniting the reconciliation process in the 
country by closely working with local NGOs that aim at fostering inter-ethnic relations. 
In doing so the dependency of the country on the Office could be reduced gradually 
up to the point where it can be safely dismantled.  
3.2:  The EU Engagement in Bosnia Herzegovina 
 
Following the failure of the European Union to avoid the outbreak of War in the 
Balkans, the organisation was side-lined for much of the conflict as other 
International Actors moved in to take its place. The EU was also largely excluded 
from the subsequent peace negotiations and the creation of the Dayton accords. 
[Chandler 2006] Following the signing of the Dayton Agreements, the EU assumed 
responsibility for the immediate post conflict reconstruction in the region. [Juncos 
2011 pp.83-103] Especially Bosnia, where the failure of the Unions appeasement 
policy had been felt the hardest, became subject to increasing EU intervention, as 
the organisation took over responsibility for institution building and economic 
transformation. Today the EU is present through a variety of regional projects 
affecting all aspects of statehood. Its engagement ranges from programmes aimed at 
improving the country’s finances to regional groups which target the country’s lagging 
agricultural sector.16   
The Union also established its own military mission in the country and eventually took 
over responsibilities for maintaining the integrity of the country from the UN. In doing 
so the mission has had an unmitigated success and violent conflict seems 
improbable today. The role of EUFOR Althea has subsequently changed into a 
support mission to the Civilian EU Administration. [Dziewulska 2010],the latter is 
headed by the EU Special Representative for Bosnia who is responsible for 
coordinating the different missions established in the country and more generally 
oversee the peace process in the country. However unfortunately the EUSR was not 
given the necessary powers to effectively carry out this task. The office has no right 
to manage any of the EU missions or programmes, nor was it given the ability to 
influence or challenge any decision taken by the head of the missions. In fact the 
only requirement to the head of any mission in Bosnia is to consult with the EUSR 
over the proposed course of action. He is subsequently not bound to adhere to the 
EUSR judgment and may decide to ignore his opinion. [Dziewulska 2010] Moreover 
                                                          
16
 http://europa.ba/Default.aspx?id=2&lang=EN List of all the current EU Projects in BiH 
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there is no requirement, nor provision that requires the different heads of missions to 
coordinate their work amongst each other.  
In the absence of effective coordination, Head of Missions have primarily concerned 
themselves with obtaining the goals set by their own programmes without paying 
attention to the work done by other bodies. This has made EU engagement very 
resource intensive as many tasks have been duplicated. Also in regards to the 
Bosnian Elite, the lack of coordination has led to an inconsistent approach towards 
the latter which has undermined the credibility of the mission at large  and made it 
vulnerable to corruption by local actors. [Sebastian 2013] 
 
The primary vehicle through which the EU has tried to introduce its policy agenda in 
the region has been membership conditionality. This technique has already been 
successfully utilised in Central and Eastern Europe in order to approximate those 
countries to the European standard. Membership conditionality has been introduced 
through the creation of the so called Copenhagen Criteria. This document outlined 
certain economic and political reforms that need to be introduced before accession 
could take place. [Nugent 2004] 
This document signified a sharp shift in the EUs policy towards potential new 
Members. Until the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1980s 
approximation of institutional, economic and social standards could be achieved after 
Accession had taken place. It was assumed that through the exposure to EU norms 
and values, the newly accessed countries would be influenced in approximating their 
own democracies to that of other Member States. The Mediterranean enlargement 
however proved that it became increasingly hard to influence countries once EU 
Membership had been granted. [Royo et al 2007] Moreover the impact of taking in 
countries with fairly underdeveloped economic systems was much larger than 
originally anticipated. It became clear that with regards to the newly establishing 
democracies in the East a new approach had to be found. Therefore the Central and 
Eastern European Countries were the first to become subjected to these very 
demanding political and economic conditions which were clearly linked to the 
transition process towards democracy and market economy. These conditions have 
subsequently been toughened with each additional enlargement.  
Uniquely to the Western Balkans, the EU introduced the Stability and Association 
Process which was to aim at increasing regional cooperation and thereby facilitate 
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reconciliation. Moreover it was to promote the adherence to democratic and 
economic reforms as well as the adherence to Human Rights. [Anastasakis et al 
2003] Drawing from their experience in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU hoped 
that through mutual cooperation, levels of development would soon approximate 
which would offer the potential  for another regional enlargement. Previously this had 
seen countries such as Slovakia and Hungary work together peacefully in order to 
obtain EU membership. 
Albeit the wishful thinking, the process that developed in the Western Balkans bear 
no resemblance to the CEEs enlargement. Rather than fostering cooperation and 
increasing reform effort, the EU approach towards the region has led to a visible 
division between the laggards and the frontrunners and created an increased hostile 
environment in which any party refuses to take responsibility for the lack of progress 
with regards to the accession procedure. [Anastasakis et al 2003] 
Scholars, such as Tzifakis, Dziewulska and Vasilev, have explained this divergence 
of the two processes by two means. Firstly the nations in the Western Balkans are 
typically heterogenic and ethnic relations are usually not harmonious. [Tzifakis 2012] 
Although animosities did exist in Central Europe as well, they were far less 
pronounced and were largely established between rather than within countries. 
Secondly the Western Balkans just came out of a decade long war in which many of 
these actors were supporting different sides in the conflict. The cessation of war, 
officially solved existing border disputes but in reality many local actors have not 
come to terms with the present borders. As a direct result of the war an air of mistrust 
and contempt prevails between different ethnic groups and countries. [Vasilev 2011]  
Given the preconditions on the ground, the failure to account for these problems 
seems almost ludicrous and seriously limited the success of the EU’s engagement in 
the region.   
 
With regards to Bosnia, problems with the EUs approach towards the country have 
extended far beyond the inability to establish regional cooperation. As with the rest of 
the region, the EU failed to account for Bosnia’s special situation and simply 
assumed that the incentive of Membership would be strong enough to convince 
national elites, to put aside their differences and work constructively towards 
achieving the necessary reforms. [Dziewulska 2010] Doing so,  the EU has failed to 
understand that each ethnic group is currently undertaking its own cost benefit 
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analysis regarding the merits of EU Membership. Therefor by treating Bosnia like an 
ordinary transition country, the EU failed to adjust its policies to the needs of a  
divided society and thereby gave away any chance for early membership success. 
[Tzifakis 2012] The precarious realisation with Bosnia is that EU Membership is 
actually contrary to the interests of at least two of the three ethnic groups featured in 
the country, plainly because it can be associated with a power shift from the minority 
towards the majority. [Vasilev 2011] In other countries in the region such as 
Macedonia both ethnic groups equally gain from EU membership, which has 
encouraged them to work constructively towards reaching this goal. In the case of 
Bosnia most of the required reforms aim at increasing state functionality and 
therefore require a transfer of power from regional administrations towards the 
Central government. As the majority of the Bosnian elite is solely concerned with 
retaining their access to power, they feel actively threatened by these requirements. 
[Vasilev 2011] The Bosnian Serbs would have to make the biggest sacrifice as they 
potentially would stand to lose their cherished entity while gaining only minor regional 
powers as a result of EU Membership. 
As a former director for the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, has pointed out to me for the 
Bosnian Serbs, the current status of the country is actually optimal to maximise their 
influence on a domestic as well as on an international scale.17 Unsurprisingly they 
have proven resilient to any previous reform efforts. 
Hence in the absence of a broad consensus amongst political, economic and social 
elites as to the necessity of EU guided democratization and marketization, the EUs 
accession carrot cannot be expected to work simply because EU membership Is not 
perceived as the most ideal outcome for all groups in the country. 
  
With regards to the unfavourable outcome for a large part of the Bosnian population, 
compliance with EU conditionality has generally been low. The EU has for the most 
part failed to address this issue and has instead  resorted to weakening their 
demands in order to allow for compliance. This has established a sense of progress 
towards the outside but simultaneously seriously undermined the EUs accession 
strategy in the country. [Lasheras 2014 a] 
                                                          
17
 Personal conversation with a former Director from the General Secretariat of the CoE, December 2014 
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If we take as an example, the reform of the country’s police corps, we can clearly see 
how this process has been damaging the EU’s credibility vis a vis local elites. 
After initial unwillingness to reform the entity based police forces and create a 
common national police corps, the EU decided to include police reform as part of 
their conditionality approach.[Aybet 2011] In doing so it hoped to foster an agreement 
over the issue and avoid another political deadlock. 
However it soon became apparent that the animosities between the parties was so 
high that none of them would be willing to compromise. Especially Bosniaks and 
Serbs vociferously insisted that their original demands had to be met. After several 
rounds of negotiations failed and talks had effectively halted, the EU decided to 
soften its demands regarding the reform. This allowed the RS to make some 
cosmetic concessions regarding state level decision making and thereby comply with 
the EU’s demands. In practice, not much has changed and the entities still largely 
operate separate police forces, which drain the state budget.[Dzihic 2011] 
However the process has been important insofar as it once again proved to the 
Bosnian elites that EU conditions were endlessly negotiable and eventually quasi 
non-compliance was being rewarded. This has inspired the different parties to 
continuously questioning demands made by the Union in an attempt to facilitate 
compliance. [Dzihic 2011] The main issue is that many of the EUs demands are not 
sufficiently fleshed out and are therefore hardly understandable. More often than not 
this has created an air of arbitrariness as the list of conditional ties was extended 
while the process went on. In the absence of sufficient explanations, to the necessity 
of these reforms, Bosnian politicians have resorted to ignore many of the EU 
demands and simply accuse them of deliberately undermining the country’s progress. 
[Lasheras 2014a] Some think tanks have made similarly accusations towards the EU, 
as some of the demands seem almost hypocritical, given that there presently exists 
no EU consensus on them. In the light of this sticking to certain demands 
unnecessarily impedes process. This criticism has been most profoundly voiced over 
the compliance with the   ECHR’s decision on Sejdic and Finic . 
Making the compliance with the ECHR subject to EU conditionality has been 
frequently criticised from non-state actors as it was found that more restrictive 
electoral systems are deployed by two EU member states. This has refuelled the 
criticism with regards to the existence of a double standard between existing 
members and aspiring members. [Juncos 2011 pp.83-103] 
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In Belgium, elections for the Brussels Parliament, are held according to a strict quota 
which divides seats between French and Dutch delegates. Politicians are asked to 
identify with anyone community and may subsequently not change their affiliation.  
Based on their decision, individuals may then be excluded from certain offices such 
as the PM for the Brussels Region. [ESI 2013] 
The electoral system of Cyprus takes this a step further. Were in Belgium nationals 
are free to associate with any community, regardless of their personal background, in 
Cyprus a person is assigned to a community based on the background of ones 
parents. This affiliation can be changed but the electoral law makes it almost possible 
for anyone to do so. [ESI 2013] 
The Bosnian electoral system is similar to the ones found in Belgium and Cyprus. 
However affiliation to any community can be chosen freely and may also be 
subsequently changed in the future. In theory it would be possible to have a Jewish 
Serb, a Roma Croat or an Orthodox Bosnian as religious affiliation is regarded 
separate from community affiliation. Of course in practice identification with any one 
community still runs strongly along religious lines but the mere possibility to identify 
freely puts it above many other electoral systems. 
Most think tanks that represent the opinion that the conditionalization of Sejdic/Finic 
artificially hampers progress, agree that eventually the judgment has to be complied 
with but deem the importance that has been given to the issue excessive. 
On other occasions, scholars have argued that the whole accession process in the 
Region has been more subject to a political agenda rather than actual progress on 
the EU Agenda. Ana Juncos has highlighted that the decision about opening 
association negotiations with Croatia had more to do with a deal among the member 
states rather than Croatia’s actual cooperation with the ICTY, which was significantly 
lower than in Bosnia. Similarly she points out that the EU signed an Association 
Agreement with Serbia despite the country’s persistent failure to comply with EU 
conditions. At the same time Bosnia was refused an SAA for the very same reason of 
not complying with EU demands. [Juncos 2005] 
Incidents like this have largely led to the questioning of the country’s appeal to the 
European Union. Some politicians, have argued that just like Turkey, the EU was 
trying to artificially draw out the accession process by erecting more and more 
barriers to Membership which are unique to Bosnia. They suspect that due to the 
country’s Muslim majority, the EU is hesitant of allowing Bosnia to join. The recent 
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enlargement fatigue, only increased this perception. With the prospects of 
Membership waning, the readiness of elites to accept changes to the status quo has 
been further reduced. The European Elites have done little to refute these concerns. 
In fact HR Valentin Inzko recently stated that Bosnia will most probably not be ready 
to join the European Union before 2020. [Tzifiakis 2012] Likewise Commission 
President Junker has stated that there would be no more accession under his 
Presidency. [New Europe 2014] 
Apart from conditionality, political change has been introduced in the country via the 
means of external institution building. Almost all the institutions present in modern 
day Bosnia have been created at the hands of the European Union through the 
deployment of Institution Building programmes. Through these programmes the 
Union has been able to impose their own conception of good governance on the 
country and create institutions that mirror institutions found in other Member States. 
[Juncos 2011pp. 83-103] While using the concept of best practice is in itself not a 
bad approach, while doing so the EU paid little regard to local traditions and interest. 
Like so much of the international engagement in Bosnia, institution building has been 
based on the assumption that the source of development is irrelevant given sufficient 
exposure. Albeit mentoring on the proper use of these institutions was carried out, it 
was done at a speed not normal for many Western European countries, let alone a 
country in democratic transition. [Lasheras 2014a]   If the elite and the bureaucracy 
fail to understand the importance of the laws they are rubberstamping or the 
institutions that are created by International Actors, there is an increased risk for 
problems regarding the effective future governance of the country. Much like with the 
OHR, the country has been continuously reliant on the work of International Actors in 
order to bring the country forward. [Lasheras 2014a] However by doing so, without 
incorporating local elites, the International Community has reinforced this 
dependency. This has created a vicious circle through which dependency leads to 
more external statebuiliding, which in turn leads back to dependency.  
Some scholars such as Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener from the Democratization 
Policy Council have therefore a accused the EU for actively worsening the situation in 
the country by willingly ignoring the failure of external institution building and instead 
continue with business as usual [Bassuener et al 2014] Although I agree with this 
assessment to the extent that the EU had a large stake in creating the current 
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situation, I would not go as far as identifying the Union as the main culprit. Local 
Elites carry at least the same if not more responsibility for the present situation. The 
presence of the EU has always been widely abused by  the local elites and just the 
same as the OHR, they have instrumentalised the Union, in an attempt to secure 
their power base. The vital mistake the EU has made in this regard is to ignore this 
development and resume with business as usual. In doing so they have reasserted 
the inflexible political system that has dominated Bosnia for the past twenty years. 
 
3.3: The German-British Initiative 
 
Following the Conference of Western Balkan States in August 2014, the British and 
German governments presented a new joint approach which aimed at putting 
Bosnia’s derailed EU accession process back on track. This came as a surprise to 
many as previously the two countries were rarely on the same page regarding their 
approach towards  Bosnia. Whereas the UK believed in top down state building, the 
Germans together with large parts of Continental Europe favoured the domestic 
ownership of the process. [Gavric et al 2014] The consecutive terms of British HR 
Paddy Ashdown and  German HR Christian Schwarz Schilling, offer a good 
illustration of these differing approaches. Whereas the former heavily engaged in 
external state building, the latter aimed at encouraging institutional reform by means 
of mediation rather than coercion. In the end both approaches failed. Institutions 
established and Legislation adopted under Ashdown have subsequently been 
undermined and Schwarz Schilling failed at encouraging local ownership of the 
reform process. Some see this new initiative as a middle way, whereas others have 
interpreted it as the British having come to terms with the majority opinion on Bosnia 
Herzegovina. [Gavric et al 2014] [Weber et al 2014] 
The new approach takes some inspiration from a proposal made by Croatia earlier 
last year, in which the country argued to grant Bosnia the status of a Special EU 
Candidate Country. It suggested rather than establishing high criteria and waiting for 
them to be adopted, the EU should take a proactive stance in the relations with the 
country. Foremost Croatia echoed the call made by some regional Think Tanks to 
remove the implementation of the Sejdic Finic judgment from the list of prerequisites 
towards the EU. Instead the issue should be solved as part of a wider Constitutional 
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Reform, once Candidate Status has been obtained. [vecernji.hr 2014] 
The British German initiative indeed increases the flexibility of involved actors 
regarding the implementation of the ECHR decision and  suggests to start reforms in 
areas where more agreement is likely to be found. However it reinstates that 
eventually the matter will have to be addressed.18 [gov.uk 2014] 
The Democratization Policy Council, has heavily criticized this decision as it sees in it 
another softening of the EU’s conditionality and therefor assumes that it will not help 
to increase the credibility of EU engagement in Bosnia. In general amongst experts, 
the reaction to the Initiative has been rather muted. The main criticism regards the 
fact that the initiative fails to address the main problem of previous EU approaches. 
By restraining relations to the Bosnian elite, the EU is again cooperating with the 
main culprits for the current situation. Again other institutions are left out of the loop 
and the civil society will only be incorporated via a new EU membership campaign. 
[Weber et al 2014] It seems unlikely that the newly elected leadership will be any 
more responsive to the EU’s demands than the outgoing administration given that 
they are largely drawn from the same parties.  
Moreover the Democratisation Policy Council has criticised the absence of any form 
of sticks. The so often demanded financial conditionality has still not being agreed 
upon, mainly out of fear for potential social unrest.  However the DPC assumes that 
in the absence of credible punitive mechanisms, the local elite will be rather 
unimpressed by EU demands. [Weber et al 2014] Lastly the think tank highlights that 
the outline of this new approach puts emphasis on reforms but fails again at clearly 
defining what will be expected on part of the EU.  
The European Council on Foreign Relations was similarly muted and albeit they see 
the re-engagement with Bosnia in itself as a good thing, they assume that the current 
plan is based on assumptions that are clearly not a reality. [Lasheras 2014 b] It relies 
too much on the willingness of the elite to move the country towards the EU and the 
attraction of enlargement as a catalyst for true reform.  They also warn that the 
progress achieved so far is superficial and easily retractable should the elite so wish. 
They concluded that at best the new initiative could enhance accountability of local 
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 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/bosnia-herzegovina-a-new-strategic-approach Speech by Foreign 
Secretary Phillip Hammond revealing the new approach. 
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politicians but in the absence of a unified civil society, this is of little use [Lasheras 
2014 b] 
While reactions to the proposal have been mixed what is the most striking to me is 
that in no way is the EU reflecting on past approaches and taking account on why 
those might have failed. At large, this new approach is similarly to previous efforts 
and it is hard to see from today how this approach is going to be more successful 
than its predecessors. 
That said, the Initiative is still young and it will be subject to future assessments to 
scrutinise the success of the programme once it has been implemented.  
 
If the bread in the oven is a failure you lose a week; if the harvest is a failure you lose a 
year; if marriage is a failure then you lose a life.19 
 
Over the course of this paper I have tried to establish the difficult political situation 
that prevails in Bosnia Herzegovina. The country features an inherently flawed 
political system which reinforces the ethnic populism that led to the outbreak of the 
Yugoslav War in the 1990s. As we have seen the development of the current 
situation was due to a process influenced and encouraged by a variety of actors.  
Firstly through the insistence on ethnic segregation, the International Actors in the 
country have laid the foundation for the present political system. Through external 
state building, a political system has been created, which does not fit the needs of a 
young democracy such as Bosnia. The inability of local actors to work with the new 
system has left it open to corruption by various power groups. By ignoring this 
development and moving along with business as usual, the international actors have 
contributed to the aggravating situation.  
Secondly, local elites have comfortably accommodated to the present situation in the 
country and have therefore been unwilling to change it. As we have seen at present 
these actors enjoy the largest share of power while carrying the lowest amount of 
responsibility. Moreover the present situation offers multiple ways for politicians to 
dodge responsibility and avoid accountability for political shortcomings. 
                                                          
19
 Estonian Proverb 
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Lastly, Civil Society in Bosnia has been highly responsive to ethnic nationalism but 
rather less to the detrimental situation in the country. This can be contributed to the 
country’s history, which has led to the development of a complicated set of 
behavioural norms, which still largely shapes societal relations.  
In my view, the solution to the Bosnian conundrum lies within creating a system 
which can increase the pressure on local elites to implement necessary reforms.  
However to be effective, pressure must not just come from a single source but a 
multitude of independent sources. 
So far all the engagements with the country have been top down. This means that 
International Actors have been communicating solely with the political elites, in an 
effort to pressure them into enacting reforms. Local Elites in turn were expected to 
engage with civil society and convince them of the necessity for the required reforms. 
However this approach is inherently flawed as it assumes that externally induced 
pressure will suffice to win national leaders over. This assumption has been proven 
wrong on multiple occasion and unsurprisingly communication with civil society has 
been diluted to fit the needs of local actors. I therefore believe that any new approach 
must aim at developing a new set of communication channels which focuses on a 
variety of actors within the country.  
In the past  civil society and non-state actors have being largely left out of the loop 
and even vis á vis the political leadership communication has often barely existed. 
This was especially true during the height of the state building process. As we have 
seen, notably with regards to the OHR, decisions were often  taken without the 
inclusion of local actors. This has made them appear arbitrary and left them open to 
be exploited by national elites. As we have seen in the case of police reform, the 
inability of the European Union to successfully communicate the need for the reform, 
made it impossible for an agreement to develop. Given that there is no common 
police structure on a European level, local politicians focused on this point, to 
discharge the EU’s demands as unfounded. Looking outside in it is clear that a 
reform of the existing policing system is necessary as it is both cost intensive and 
ineffective. However from the inside, the insistence of the EU to create a unified 
police corps, at the expense of the entities, appeared highly hypocritical.  
Improving the communication with local elites, will offer the opportunity to detect 
areas for compromise while also making the case for any given reform more 
effectively. Also if politicians feel that their concerns and interests are being taken 
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seriously, they may become much more flexible on certain issues. This effect can be 
increased by simultaneously improving the communication with civil society. By 
gathering support for needed reforms in the population at large, it is possible to 
increase upwards pressure on politicians to implement them.  
Improved communication must also mean reinforcing Bosnia’s claim to membership. 
Over the years, people in the country have come to believe that the potential for EU 
membership has been reduced to the distant future. The EU has so far done little to 
counteract this believe. In fact recent statements made by key officials have rather 
confirmed this suspicion, leaving a detrimental impact on the willingness to execute 
reforms. 
If we go back to the CEEs enlargement we can see that the readiness on part of the 
population and the leadership to go through with reforms has been directly linked to 
the goal of future membership. However with membership perspectives dwindling, 
the effectiveness of the accession carrot becomes increasingly limited. Hence it 
seems only logical that any increased communication with the country at large must 
also aim at refuting the concerns about Membership and signify that the future of the 
country lies within the European Union. The recent initiative led by Germany and the 
UK is a step in the right direction but far from being enough to reverse years of active 
European neglect. Only if the cooperation with the country increases and there is 
notable progress, will society’s opinion shift. This is by no means an easy 
achievement but necessary to increase the rate at which reforms are implemented. 
 
Once these communication channels are in place, the EU must address the previous 
shortcomings of its conditionality approach. As we have seen the Union has been 
rather unsuccessful in establishing and enforcing conditionality in the country. In the 
past there has been a lot of non-compliance or minimal compliance at best. Much of 
this comes down to two problems that the EU has so far been unwilling to address 
Firstly, the EUs conditionality is inherently broad and lacks clear cut definitions 
regarding the fulfilment of said conditions. Given the large amount of different actors 
within the country information issued to local elites differ highly, often depending on 
the respondents personal assessment. Secondly, in an effort to keep the 
enlargement momentum alive the EU has repeatedly resorted to weakening its 
conditionality approach. This has also been abused by local actors as they have 
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come to question each and  every instruction coming from the Union in an attempt to 
weaken conditionality. This has seriously evaded its success rate in the region.  
In order to avoid this from happening in the future, I think any new conditionality 
approach must be leaner and clearer. The amount of demands should be reduced 
while offering precise definitions with regards to actual content. Locals need to know 
at any point what is expected of them and when a condition has been fulfilled. This 
will help to increase the credibility of future conditionality and reduce the air of 
arbitrariness presently surrounding many demands. Following this process of 
streamlining, there must also be no more weakening of the new conditions. This will 
be increasingly difficult in the beginning as local elites will definitely try to exploit any 
weakness on the part of the Union. However if the EU remains stern, politicians will 
eventually come to terms with the changed circumstances and will become much 
more responsive to change.  
 
Once the ground for future reform has been prepared, our attention must now turn to 
the institutional setup. As I have shown within this paper, the majority of the existing 
state institutions are seriously flawed and to move the country away from its current 
status means complete overhauling the system.  
The Union has so far been largely concerned with encouraging constitutional reform 
and failed to take into account, that constitutional reconstruction represents only one 
step in a larger process of reforming the whole Bosnian political system. It is widely 
believed that constitutional change must be the first step, which would offer the 
possibility of further institutional reform. However true this may be, faced with a 
largely uninterested political elite, not much progress can be expected on this topic.  
The EU should therefor shift its focus towards the institutions themselves and 
encourage reforms from within the system. At present, most of the institutions found 
in the country have been created through external state building and were largely 
found unsuitable for the needs of the local population. Apart from disregarding certain 
cultural specifications and values, the working of these institutions is largely alien to 
local actors. This has made them constantly reliant on outside assistances to ensure 
the creation of legislation. This has repeatedly reinforced the post war status of 
Bosnia in the past twenty years.   
I would assume that it therefor makes sense to give internal actors  a bigger stake in 
the reform process. If the institutions themselves agree on a broad set of reforms and 
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are willing to carry them out, it will become increasingly harder for local elites to deny 
them the process. Here again there would be a bottom up process, where lower level 
bureaucrats are used to apply pressure on high level politicians to implement 
reforms.  
However, when carrying out this approach, the EU must take special care, not to 
repeat past mistakes, that have previously brought the entire process to a halt.   
One of the reasons that constitutional reform has become such a disputed topic was 
the decision of the EU to make it a precondition for the opening of membership 
negotiations. To avoid this, the institutional reforms should not be made subject to 
conditionality but instead be embedded in the wider process of negotiating future 
membership. The two processes would then be given the chance to reaffirm each 
other. The political criteria in the Copenhagen statutes make it necessary to ensure 
these reforms prior to Membership, which will give them increased importance as the 
process evolves. 
 
Lastly we have to address the most important but equally the most challenging 
aspect of any future approach towards Bosnia. Any new policy proposal must also 
aim at improving the reconciliation of society, so as to increase its chance of 
succeeding. Only if society is on the same page with regards to the future of the 
country, will it be able to effectively apply pressure on local elites to execute the 
necessary reforms. In order for this to happen, civil society must come to terms with 
the role their respective ethnic group played in the course of the war. This is easier 
said than done, because as we have seen mistrust and suspicion has been a 
common feature of Bosnian society throughout most of its history. Although society at 
large was able to work together constructively in times of peace, any conflict would 
turn into a proxy war, with the population aligning along ethnic/religious lines. The 
utilisation of specific ethnic groups by former rulers of the Bosnian territory, to control 
the rest of population, has over time deeply ingrained this behaviour into society. To 
this day, any act by an ethnic group is assumed to follow a hidden agenda which only 
aims at aiding their own cause to the detriment of other groups. 
In order to ensure peaceful relations in the past, Bosnian society has developed the 
peculiar maxim of Let Bygones be Bygones, according to which all deeds that 
happened in times of conflicts will be automatically forgiven. Albeit, this has helped to 
normalise relations quickly after conflicts had ended, it deeply engrained a sense of 
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mistrust and animosity within the population at large. This was painfully exhibited in 
the run up to the Bosnia War, where ethnic leaders found it easy to rally their kin 
behind their cause. Since the cessation of the conflict, the country has never been 
able to come to rest as ethnic leaders continued to utilise ethno nationalistic rhetoric 
to incite parts of society against each other. This is most striking in divided cities such 
as Mostar or Tuzla, where twenty years after the conflict has ended, societal relations 
have still not normalised. Life in these cities is still largely separated along ethnic 
lines and intercultural exchange is uncommon. Moreover, no group in the country has 
so far come to terms with their role in the Bosnian War and largely rejects any liability 
for the atrocities committed during the conflict. Coming myself from a country which 
has struggled for decades to accept its role in WWII, I can easily relate to the present 
situation in Bosnia. I nevertheless see the need for a better handling of history in 
order for societal relations to normalise which in turn will deny local politicians to 
exploit societal tensions  as a cheap way of harvesting electoral support.   
In order to facilitate this development, any future engagement with the country should 
aim at not just increasing communication between EU officials and local actors but 
also enhance the inter-ethnic communication in divided towns. Doing so may 
facilitate future cooperation and the establishment of a unified consensus with 
regards to the future of the country. 
With respect to large parts of the Republika Srpska which, due to actions carried out 
during the war, have become widely homogenised, more emphasis must be put on 
increasing the numbers of expellees returning to the region. According to various 
regional NGOs only a small part of the original population has so far decided to return 
to their regions of origin. In the absence of active contact with other ethnic groups, 
societal reconciliation is made quasi  impossible and ethnic leaders will be reelected 
as they appear as defenders of the communal interest. By trying to reinstate some of 
the diversity lost in the region, through encouraging returnees, reconciliation could be 
facilitated.  
Another way of fostering societal propitiation, would be encouraging the creation of a 
unified school system for the whole country. In a situation where children are still 
segregated according to their ethnicity, common values and practices may never 
develop and society will remain apart. Although special caution must be given to the 
protection of cultural values, unique to each ethnic group, it must nevertheless be 
possible to educate pupils according to a common curriculum. There are already 
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several NGOs present in the country that work towards obtaining this goal. Various 
experiments in cities such as Mostar have shown positive results, as children struck 
friendships across ethnic lines and differences started to disappear. 
In my mind the supervision of this reconciliation process could be assigned to the 
OHR in an effort of finding a new use for the office. As we have concluded the office 
in its present form has definitely run its cause and if it was to prevail, a new role for 
the office has to be found.  Given its high standing within large parts of civil society, 
this would make it suitable for the task at hand and also make it more likely to 
succeed than any EU led campaign. In a first step, the Office should be relieved of its 
law making powers, while retaining its dismissal powers. The latter should be 
subjected to increased scrutiny both by the local judiciary as well as outside actors. 
Doing so would signify a step away from external state building and also 
acknowledge and address concerns related to abuse of the office in the past. Once 
this is achieved the Office could engage in promoting and supervising the return of 
displaced persons to their original homes, as well as work with local NGOs in an 
attempt to create a unified educational standard. The remainder of the Bonn powers 
may be used to discipline local actors, aiming at undermining the process. Once this 
mandate is seen as being fulfilled a renewed effort towards closing the office could 
be ignited. 
 
All in all, this set of recommendations issued above may act as a starting point for 
any future engagement with Bosnia Herzegovina.  
Taken together, these strategies could help create a system which effectively applies 
threefold pressure on local elites. Once from the outside through the European Union 
and twice from the inside via the local population and institutional actors. If this 
increased pressure is balanced with a newfound conditionality approach, which 
makes it easier to understand and comply with EU demands, I am positive that this 
would eventually lead to increased reform efforts and cooperation on the parts of the 
local elites. This approach does not offer the solution to all the problems that may 
arise in the implementation of this process and there is of course no guarantee that 
the above issued proposals would actually have the desired effect. However it 
presents a fresh start, which takes into account the past failures of international 
engagement and tries to offer some remedying qualities with regards to them. 
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Due to its historic and cultural background, Bosnia is far too diverse a country for any 
one person to successfully predict the behaviour of local actors to any future EU 
approach. The country largely still works on the basis of a complex value system, 
whose understanding is vital for creating a successful policy towards it. As I have 
shown there is a large body of literature available which exclusively deals with Bosnia 
and the difficult political situation in the country. For years such experts have deemed 
the EU’s approach towards the country to be unfeasible and have asked the 
organisation to reconsider its engagement. So far these calls have been largely 
ignored and business as usual has been presumed. In the future the EU should draw 
from the readily available literature and maybe consider deploying experts when 
rewriting its policy towards Bosnia. Most importantly any new approach must accept 
the failures of the past and redeem itself by finding ways to avoid them in the future. 
Finally I wish to reaffirm my claims from the onset of this paper. In my mind the 
successful accommodation of Bosnia must be understood as being integral for the 
success of the Europeanisation process in the Western Balkans. Many of the 
problems encountered in Bosnia also exist in neighbouring countries, albeit on a 
much smaller scale. This means that any future conflict in the country has also the 
potential to affect the entire region. It must therefore be understood that any process 
in Bosnia must include local actors such as Serbia or Croatia which presently have a 
large stake in the country and who would be affected the most from an unstable 
situation in Bosnia. Finding a way forward with regards to Bosnia, may also facilitate 
solutions on other pressing issues such as the relations between Serbia and Kosovo 
or the dispute between Macedonia and Greece. Eventually the whole region would 
profit from a stabilised Bosnia as it would also increase the potential for enlargement 
in the entire region. 
The bottom line is that if the European Union is truly dedicated to including the 
Western Balkans in the Community, it will have to start taking the situation in Bosnia 
seriously and find ways of addressing it properly.  
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